The Moro War: How America Battled A Muslim Insurgency In The Philippine Jungle, 1902-1913
As the global war on terror enters its second decade, the United States military is engaged with militant Islamic insurgents on multiple fronts. But the post-9/11 war against terrorists is not the first time the United States has battled such ferocious foes. The forgotten Moro War, lasting from 1902 to 1913 in the islands of the southern Philippines, was the first confrontation between American soldiers and their allies and a determined Muslim insurgency. The Moro War prefigured American wars in Iraq and Afghanistan more than superficially: It was a bitter, drawn-out conflict in which American policy and aims were fiercely contested between advocates of punitive military measures and proponents of conciliation. As in today’s Middle East, American soldiers battled guerrillas in a foreign environment where the enemy knew the terrain and enjoyed local support. The deadliest challenge was distinguishing civilians from suicidal attackers. Moroland became a crucible of leadership for the U.S. Army, bringing the force that had fought the Civil War and the Plains Indian Wars into the twentieth century. The officer corps of the Moro campaign matured into the American generals of World War I. Chief among them was the future general John Pershing—who learned lessons in the island jungles that would guide his leadership in France. Rich with relevance to today’s news from the Middle East, and a gripping piece of storytelling, The Moro War is a must-read to understand a formative conflict too long overlooked and to anticipate the future of U.S. involvement overseas.

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I teach a class at the Virginia Military Institute where we examine various guerrilla wars and insurgencies—a historical analysis of winning and losing counterinsurgency strategies. This class is relevant to many of the cadets who are to be commissioned in the U.S. military and could deploy to Afghanistan and other COIN hot spots. I have made James Arnold’s book: The Moro War: How America Battled a Muslim Insurgency in the Philippine Jungle, 1902-1913, required reading. Arnold is an excellent writer and researcher and presents this little known American counterinsurgency adventure in an interesting and relevant way. Few Americans have ever read, let alone, studied the U.S.’s early 20th century bitter counterinsurgency struggles in the Philippines—specifically the U.S.’s fight against Filipino Muslim guerrillas (1902-1913). Most U.S. high school and college American history courses brush by this period paying mere lip service to the Spanish-American War—pointing out Teddy Roosevelt and the Rough Riders’ ride up San Juan Hill and a few other highlights and moving on to World War I. Instead, James Arnold vividly describes in his book how the U.S. military (post Spanish-American War) through 11 years of bitter and bloody fighting was able to quell and semi-pacify the Muslim guerrillas in the Southern Philippines. While the war against the Muslim insurgents is considered a victory—however, unlike today’s U.S. counterinsurgency mantra of trying to “win hearts and minds,” it was accomplished mostly through overwhelming U.S. firepower, starvation and forced relocation of civilians, and wide-spread slaughter of Filipino civilians. Arnold, however, does point out many unique counterinsurgency tactics and strategies that the U.S.